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LIST OF ALL PARTIES

The appellant is the State of Utah, by and through its
Attorney General, David L. Wilkinson.

The respondents include Utah

Power & Light Company, Orrin T. Colby, Jr., Karl J. Stott
and Norman Maxfield.

In addition to these respondents, additional

parties were present at the September 12, 1984 hearing before Judge
Bunnell.

Those additional parties were Emery Mining Corporation,

represented by F. Robert Reeder and Francis M. Wikstrom; Michael C.
Thompson, Bruce A. Conklin and Michael Ziemski, represented by Max
D. Wheeler; and L. Brent Fletcher, represented by Sumner J. Hatch.
The Attorney General apparently takes the position that
Emery Mining Corporation is a proper party on appeal but that
Messrs. Thompson, Conklin, Ziemski and Fletcher are not.
Appellant's Brief at i.

See

In the preliminary hearings before this

Court, counsel for Emery Mining Corporation and counsel for the
individuals, Thompson, Conklin, Ziemski and Fletcher have all been
present and have participated in the proceedings, including the
filing of motions.
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Whether Utah Code Ann. SS 77-22-1 through 3 (1953)

(the "Mini-Grand Jury Act") violates either the Constitution of
Utah or the Constitution of the United States because it permits
the compulsory processes of the State to be employed without
sufficient judicial supervision and without adequate procedural
safeguards.
2.

Whether proceedings conducted by prosecutors under the

Mini-Grand Jury Act are accusatory in nature and therefore require
greater due process procedural safeguards than are provided under
the Act.
3.

Whether the Mini-Grand Jury Act violates the

Constitution of Utah because it fails to require prosecutors to
disclose to witnesses the nature and scope of the criminal
investigation pursuant to which they have been subpoenaed.
4.

Whether the Mini-Grand Jury Act violates the

Constitution of Utah because it fails to require prosecutors to
give target warnings and to advise witnesses of their right to
assert the privilege against self-incrimination.
5.

Respondent Utah Power and Light Company incorporates

by this reference the additional issues presented on appeal that
are set forth in the briefs of Respondents Colby, Stott, Maxfield
and of Respondent Emery Mining Corporation.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a September 20, 1984 final order of
the Seventh Judicial District Court, the Honorable Boyd Bunnell/ in
which he declared the so-called Mini-Grand Jury Act, Utah Code Ann.
SS 77-22-1 through 3 (1953), unconstitutional and withdrew judicial
authorization for the Utah Attorney General to continue the
criminal investigation previously approved by the court.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Utah Power and Light Company is in basic agreement with
the Attorney General's statement of the facts except for two points
that warrant clarification.

See Appellant's Brief at 5-9.

The

Attorney General correctly states that Messrs. Darcie H. White,
W. Jack Eliason, Scott H. Christensen and David Clement appeared
pursuant to subpoena in April, 1984, with counsel and were deposed.
Mr. Richard J. Riche also was deposed in April, 1984. Each of
these men is or at one time has been employed by Utah Power and
Light Company.
Mr. Nebeker, who accompanied each of these men to their
depositions, specifically and repeatedly inquired of the Assistant
Attorneys General conducting the depositions whether these men were
subjects or targets of the criminal investigation.

See Depo. of

Darcie H. White at 4-6 (Apr. 3, 1984); Depo. of W. Jack Eliason at
3-4 (Apr. 3, 1984); Depo. of Scott H. Christensen at 4 (Apr. 13,
1984); Depo. of Richard J. Riche at 3-5 (Apr. 17, 1984) (The cited
portions of these depositions are included in the Addendum.)
-2-

Furthermore, Mr. Nebeker explicitly stated his reasons for
wanting to know whether any of the witnesses were targets of the
investigation.
stated in part:

At the outset of Mr. White's deposition, Mr. Nebeker
"I think you should at this time, be required to

tell him whether or not he is the subject of the investigation
because I think certain questions that may be put to him may
require him to take the Fifth Amendment if he deems it necessary.
I think he's entitled to know that."
(Apr. 3, 1984).

Depo. of Darcie H. White at 5

Two weeks later during the deposition of Mr. Riche,

Mr. Nebeker specifically referred to the procedural safeguards that
exist in grand jury proceedings and took the position that the same
safeguards should be extended to Mr. Riche at that deposition.
Depo. of Richard J. Riche at 4-5 (Apr. 17, 1984).
At the conclusion of the May 30, 1984 hearing before Judge
Bunnell, Mr. Nebeker was directed by the court to prepare an order
setting forth the court's rulings and then circulate it for five
days among the other counsel for their objections.

Transcript of

the May 30, 1984 Hearing at 72-73. That procedure was followed.
Because of differences among counsel as to the wording of Judge
Bunnell's ruling on the constitutionality issue, two versions of an
order were prepared.

No consensus was reached.

Finally, to comply

with the court's earlier direction Mr. Nebeker submitted both
versions of the order to Judge Bunnell along with a clear
explanation that the various counsel had been unable to agree upon
a form for the order.

See Record at 361-367.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The so-called Mini-Grand Jury Act suffers from several
deep-rooted constitutional deficiencies/ some of which are addressed
by the other respondents in their briefs.

The essence of UP&L's

position is that the Mini-Grand Jury Act does not contain critical
procedural safeguards that are mandated by the Constitution of the
United States, the Constitution of Utah and related state law.
UP&L's analysis is straightforward:

The Supreme Court

precedent which controls the types and extent of procedural
protections required in this case focuses on whether the body at
issue performs an investigatory or accusatory function.

The

Attorney General and county attorneys, as the State's own
prosecutors of criminal offenses, clearly fulfill an accusatory
role under the Act.

Accordingly, greater procedural protections

must be afforded to persons subpoenaed under the Act than are
extended to those who are compelled to give evidence before purely
investigative or fact-finding bodies.
Notwithstanding the accusatory function filled by
prosecutors under the Act, it is actually the case that the
statutes and rules of procedure governing administrative subpoenas
tend to guarantee the crucial procedural safeguards that are
missing from the Mini-Grand Jury Act.
One of the most basic safeguards missing from the Act is
any provision for ongoing judicial supervision of the subpoena
power wielded by prosecutors once the criminal investigation has
started.

The Attorney General argues that "inherent" in the Act is
-4-

the opportunity to move to quash a subpoena and that such a
procedure allegedly provides an effective pre-compliance remedy
against prosecutorial abuse*

However, the Act does not state

expressly that any such right exists and ordinary citizens cannot
be presumed to know that such a right may be inherent in our
judicial system.

Since the Act does not require prosecutors to

disclose to a witness the nature and scope of the investigation, a
person subpoenaed under the Act has no basis for determining
whether the demands of the subpoena are appropriate and cannot make
an informed decision about exercising his privilege against
self-incrimination.
It is beyond dispute that the right to assert the
privilege against self-incrimination applies to criminal investigations.

Utah statutory law, which codifies this Court's

interpretation of the Utah Constitution, requires that target
warnings and notice of the privilege against self-incrimination be
given in grand jury proceedings.

A refusal to extend the same

protections to persons compelled to give evidence in proceedings
under the Mini-Grand Jury Act violates both the equal protection
and due process provisions of the Utah Constitution.
Finally, the Attorney General should be precluded from
using any information or evidence gathered as part of this criminal
investigation in any civil proceeding.

Any exception to that

prohibition must come as a result of express judicial approval
after a showing of particularized need by the Attorney General.
No such showing has been made in this case.
-5-

ARGUMENT
I.

THE MINI-GRAND JURY ACT IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE IT NEITHER
ESTABLISHES ADEQUATE PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS TO PROTECT
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS NOR PROVIDES FOR JUDICIAL SUPERVISION OF
OTHERWISE UNBRIDLED PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION.
Judge Bunnell in his September 20, 1984 Memorandum

Decision Relative to Constitutionality summarized in precise terms
his reasons for declaring Utah Code Ann, §§ 77-22-1 throuqh 3
(1953)(the "Mini-Grand Jury Act"1 or the "Act") unconstitutional:
«

This Court has, therefore, concluded that
the Act is too vague and does not give proper
protection to individual citizens against
violation of their constitutional right of
due process and protection against selfincrimination and allows for an absolute abuse
of power without the benefit of judicial review
or control once the general subpoena power is
granted and finds the Act is unconstitutional.
Id. at 4.

Judge Bunnell's observation that the Act "allows for an

absolute abuse of power without the benefit of judicial review or
control" accurately protrays the unbridled prosecutorial discretion
given to prosecutors under the Act.
Section 77-22-2(1) authorizes the attorney general or any
county attorney to subpoena witnesses and require the production of
books, papers, documents, recordings and any other items that

*This Court in KUTV, Inc. v. Conder, 635 P.2d 412, 413 (Utah 1981),
referred to Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-22-1 through 3 as the "Mini-Grand Jury
Act". The Attorney General frequently refers to the statutes as the
"Subpoena Powers Act".

-6-

constitute evidence or that "may be relevant to the investigation
in the judgment of the attorney general or county attorney."

The

plain language of the Act leaves solely to the judgment of the
prosecutor the determination of what is "relevant" to his
investigation.

The Act imposes no standards or guidelines to limit

his exercise of judgment.

The Act does not expressly authorize

anyone to second guess his judgment.

In short, the prosecutor

possesses unfettered discretion to employ the powerful enforcement
machinery of the State any way he wants.
In an attempt to down play the likelihood of arbitrary or
capricious conduct, the Attorney General challenges the district
court*s ruling by claiming that that the opportunity to make a
motion to quash prior to compliance with a subpoena provides an
effective remedy against prosecutorial abuse. Appellant's Brief at
9-10, 13-17.

The Attorney General's extensive treatment of this

point suggests that his reliance on the purported opportunity for
an effective pre-compliance challenge is the crux of his position.
Moreover, the Attorney General concedes that "[i]f an investigative
subpoena is issued or executed in a manner that does not allow
re-compliance [sic] challenge, it might run afoul of the Fourth
Amendment."

Appellant's Brief at 18 (citation omitted).

In light

of that concession, the real issue is whether the manner in which
the Attorney General is allowed to issue subpoenas under the Act is
tantamount to no opportunity for a pre-compliance challenge.

-7-

Utah Power and Light Company ("UPStL") agrees with the
general proposition that administrative subpoena s t a t u t e s that
provide an e f f e c t i v e pre-compliance remedy, which UP&L believes
necessarily includes clear notice of the right for j u d i c i a l
intervention, pass constitutional muster.

However, UP&L sharply

d i f f e r s with the Attorney General's characterization of the
Mini-Grand Jury Act as such a s t a t u t e .

The Mini-Grand Jury Act

does not provide any e f f e c t i v e pre-compliance remedy.

The

subpoenas issued by the Attorney General under the Act in t h i s case
gave the misleading impression that they had been individually
approved by the d i s t r i c t court and threatened contempt of Court
sanctions for f a i l u r e to comply. 2

Furthermore, the subpoenas

gave no clue as to the purpose or scope of the investigation.

When

the language of the Act f a i l s to even inform c i t i z e n s of the right
to j u d i c i a l l y challenge a subpoena and when the actions of those
issuing the subpoenas have the effect of further obfuscating that
right, i t i s d i f f i c u l t to accept the argument that a technical
right of pre-compliance challenge e f f e c t i v e l y protects those
fundamental privacy i n t e r e s t s protected by the Fourth Amendment and
i t s counterpart in the Constitution of Utah. 3

2

For example, the May 16, 1984 subpoena issued to the Custodian of the
Records, Utah Power and Light Company, stated in part: "This Subpoena Duces
Tecum i s authorized by order of the District Court, Disobedience to this
order i s punishable by contempt of Court." See Addendum.
3

Article I, section 14 of the Constitution of Utah s t a t e s :
The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers and effects
-8-

The Attorney General spent so much time in h i s brief
discussing requirements for subpoenas issued by administrative
agencies that he never c r i t i c a l l y focused on the determinative
question of what the Utah Mini-Grand Jury Act actually provides or f a i l s t o provide.

A careful examination of the Act shows that

i t f a i l s t o provide any e f f e c t i v e pre-compliance remedy for at
least four reasons:

(1) the Act does not contain any procedural

safeguards other than the right to counsel and an award of immunity
i f a witness i s compelled to give testimony against himself,

(2)

the Act does not give notice of any "inherent" right to challenge
the subpoena, (3) proceedings under the Act are accusatory, not
investigatory in nature, and (4) the Act f a i l s to establish even
the key procedural safeguards contained in purely investigative
subpoena statutes or regulations.
A.

The Mini-Grand Jury Act Lacks Essential Procedural Safeguards.
Apart from a right to counsel and an award of immunity i f

a subpoenaed person i s compelled by a court to give incriminating

3

Continued;
a g a i n s t unreasonable searches and s e i z u r e s
s h a l l not be v i o l a t e d ; and no warrant s h a l l
i s s u e but upon probable cause supported by oath
or a f f i r m a t i o n , p a r t i c u l a r l y describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or thing
to be s e i z e d .

I t a l s o should be noted that the Fourth Amendment has been held
applicable to corporations. See Oklahoma Press Publishing Company v .
Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 205-06 & n . 3 5 , 90 L. Ed 2d 614, 628 & n . 3 5 , 66 S. Ct.
494 (1946) and cases c i t e d t h e r e i n .

-9-

testimony against himself, the Mini-Grand Jury Act does not
provide any procedural safeguards t o the subpoenaed person.
f a c t , the Act expressly s t a t e s that

M

In

[t]he subpoena need not

d i s c l o s e the names of possible defendants and need only contain
n o t i f i c a t i o n that the testimony of the witness i s sought in aid of
criminal investigation."

Utah Code Ann. S 77-22-1(2).

The Act

f a i l s to require prosecutors (1) t o inform witnesses of the nature
and scope of the investigation, (2) to give target warnings, and
(3) t o advise witnesses of their right to assert the p r i v i l e g e
against self-incrimination. 4
B.

The Mini-Grand Jury Act Provides No Notice Of The
A v a i l a b i l i t y Of A Pre-Compliance Remedy For Challenging
The Validity Or Reasonableness Of A Subpoena.
Nowhere in the t e x t of the Mini-Grand Jury Act i s there

any statement that a person served with a subpoena pursuant to the
Act has a right to move the court to quash or otherwise challenge
the v a l i d i t y or reasonableness of the subpoena.

The Attorney

General c i t e s no authority establishing that such a right e x i s t s
but merely asserts that "[tlhe opportunity to challenge a subpoena
i s inherent in Utah's Act."
10, 17, 26, 45.

Appellant's Brief at 19; see id. at

Although Judge Bunnell did entertain motions to

4

If this Court were to conclude, as UP&L contends infra at 12-19, that
proceedings under the Act are actually accusatory rather than purely
investigative in nature, then the Court should consider whether due process
requires the additional procedural safeguards of the right to present
evidence and the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses•

-10-

quash subpoenas in this proceeding, nothing in the language of the
Act suggests that he was under any obligation to do so.s

The

complete absence of any provision in the Act clearly stating that
such a right exists underscores the deficiency of the statute.

A

person who (a) cannot afford to retain legal counsel, (b) does not
believe that he may need legal counsel because the subpoena on its
face does not appear to implicate him, or (c) does not think that
retaining legal counsel would be useful since the subpoena purports
to already have been issued (and therefore by implication reviewed)
by order of the district court, should not be expected to know
about either the existence or efficacy of some right "inherent" in
the Act that he can exercise.

5

Although UP&L certainly does not maintain that the district court was
without power to quash the subpoenas issued pursuant to the criminal
investigation it approved, UP&L does contend that an express grant of that
power is neither found in the Act nor in the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure* Rule 14(b) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure states in part
that "[t]he court may quash or modify the subpoena if compliance would be
unreasonable." However, Rule 14(a) which enumerates certain types of
subpoenas does not appear to encompass subpoenas issued by the Attorney
General under the Mini-Grand Jury Act unless it be by implication. Rule
14(a) states in part:
A subpeona to require the attendance of a witness or
interpreter before [1] a court, [2] magistrate, or
[3] grand jury, in connection with a criminal investigation or prosecution may be issued by the magistrate with
whom the information is filed, the county attorney on his
own initiative or upon the direction of the grand jury, or
the court in which an information or indictment is to be
tried. . . .
Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-14.
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The Attorney General's argument that the Mini-Grand Jury
Act provides an effective pre-compliance remedy is predicated on
two erroneous assumptions:

First, the Attorney General equates

investigative proceedings under the Mini-Grand Jury Act with those
conducted by federal administrative agencies, legislative
committees, or even grand juries.

See discussion regarding grand

juries in Section III, infra at 36-43.

Secondly, the Attorney

General proceeds on the mistaken assumption that the two procedural
safeguards contained in the Mini-Grand Jury Act are somehow
equivalent to the multiple procedural safeguards embodied in the
statutes or rules of procedure governing federal administrative
agencies, legislative committees or grand juries.
C.

Prosecutors' Actions Under The Mini-Grand Jury Act
Are Accusatory, Rather Than Purely Investigative Or
Fact-Finding In Nature.
UP&L disputes the Attorney General's apparent suggestion

that this case is governed by Oklahoma Press Publishing Company v.
Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 90 L. Ed. 614, 66 S. Ct. 494 (1946).

Walling

is of some relevance, but UP&L maintains that the controlling cases
are Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1307, 80 S. Ct.
1502 (1960) and Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 23 L. Ed. 2d
404, 89 St. Ct. 1843 (1969).

The Supreme Court in Walling

established standards to govern administrative subpoenas which are
not the same as those issued by a prosecutor under the Act.

In

Hannah and Jenkins, the Court distinguished between accusatory and
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purely investigative bodies and made clear that due process
requires greater procedural safeguards in accusatory proceedings.
1.

Hannah v. Larche—Establishment of the
Accusatory/Investigatory Distinction.
In Hannah, the Federal Commission on Civil Rights sought

review of two lower court judgments that invalidated certain rules
of procedure adopted by the Commission pursuant to which it was
holding hearings in Louisiana to investigate alleged Black voting
deprivations.

The voting registrars and private citizens who

brought suit to challenge the Commission's hearings argued that the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment required under the
circumstances of that case that (1) they be informed of the
specific charges being investigated, (2) the identity of the
complainants be revealed, and (3) they be entitled to cross-examine
the complainants and other witnesses.
In determining what procedural rights the subjects of the
investigation were to be afforded, the Supreme Court began its
analysis by explaining that the requirements of due process
frequently vary according to the type of proceeding involved.

The

Court then outlined the duties to be performed by the Commission
which consisted of investigating written, sworn allegations of
discrimination; studying and collecting information on legal
developments relating to equal protection of the laws; and
reporting to the President and Congress on its activities, findings
and recommendations.

Id., 363 U.S. at 440-41, 4 L. Ed. 2d at
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1320.

Regarding the nature of the Commission's function, the Court

concluded:
As its] apparent from this brief sketch of
the statutory duties imposed upon the Commission,
its function is purely investigative and factfinding . It does not adjudicate. It does not
hold trials or determine anyone's civil or
criminal liability. It does not issue orders.
Nor does it indict, punish or impose any legal
sanctions. It does not make determinations
depriving anyone of his life, liberty, or
property. In short, the Commission does not and
cannot take any affirmative action which will
affect an individual's legal rights. The only
purpose of its existence is to find facts which
may subsequently be used as the basis for
legislative or executive action.
Id., 363 U.S. at 441, 4 L. Ed. 2d at 1320-21 (emphasis added).
Having concluded that the Commission's function was purely
an investigative and fact-finding one, the Court elaborated upon
the difficulties that would arise if the more complex procedural
safeguards traditionally associated with the judicial process were
infused into the investigative process.

The Court explained in

some detail that the Commission's procedures were not foreign to
the procedures used in other forms of governmental investigation,
e.g., legislative committees, administrative regulatory agencies
(specific reference was made to the Federal Trade Commission and
the Securities and Exchange Commission), presidential commissions
and grand juries.
1322-25.

See id., 363 U.S. at 444-449, 4 L. Ed. 2d at

The Court clearly noted that it was not suggesting that
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the investigative functions performed by legislative committees,
grand juries and executive agencies were identical in all
respects.*

2.

Jenkins v. McKeithen—Clarification of the
Accusatory Function.
In Hannah, the decisive d i s t i n c t i o n was whether the

i n v e s t i g a t i v e a c t i v i t i e s of the Commission affected legal rights or
not.

Further c l a r i f i c a t i o n of that d i s t i n c t i o n came in Jenkins,

supra, when an investigative commission was determined t o be
different from other administrative agencies and executive
commissions because i t served an accusatory function.

In Jenkins,

a labor union member brought an action for declaratory and
injunctive r e l i e f challenging the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of a Louisiana
statute and the actions of state o f f i c i a l s thereunder.

€

The statute

The Court s t a t e d on t h i s p o i n t :
Although we do not suggest that the grand jury and the
congressional i n v e s t i g a t i n g committee are i d e n t i c a l i n
a l l r e s p e c t s to the C i v i l Rights Commission, 30 we
mention them, i n a d d i t i o n t o the executive agencies and
commissions created by Congress, to show that the r u l e s
of t h i s Commission are not a l i e n to those which have
h i s t o r i c a l l y governed the procedure of i n v e s t i g a t i o n s
conducted by agencies in the three major branches of our
Government.

Hannah, supra, 363 U.S. a t 449 & n . 3 0 , 4 L. Ed. 2d a t 1325 & n . 3 0 . Citing to
Walling and other c a s e s , the Court did observe i n footnote 30 that courts had
"likened" i n v e s t i g a t i v e agencies of the executive branch to a grand j u r y .
For a comparison of the Utah grand jury s t a t u t e s and the Mini-Grand Jury Act,
s e e S e c t i o n I I I , i n f r a a t 36-43.
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in question created a Labor-Management Commission of Inquiry that
investigated, only upon referral from the Governor, alleged
criminal violations in the field of labor-management relations.
The statute authorized the Commission to hold public hearings to
determine whether probable cause existed to believe that criminal
violations had occurred, to make public findings, and to recommend
to appropriate authorities that criminal prosecutions be
commenced.

Nothing in the statute provided for the preparation of

findings or reports to be submitted to the Governor or the
legislature for the purpose of legislative action.
The Louisiana statute did grant certain procedural rights
to witnesses.

Those persons subpoenaed to testify were given

"notice of the general subject matter of the investigation."
395 U.S. 15 417, 23 L. Ed. 2d at 414.

Id.,

In addition to the right to

counsel, a witness was entitled to have his own counsel both
question him as to any relevant matter and submit proposed
questions to the Commission to ask other witnesses.

Furthermore,

the Commission had the right to meet in executive session when it
appeared that "testimony to be given 'may tend to degrade, defame
or incriminate any person.1"
414.

Id. 395 U.S. at 418, 23 L. Ed. 2d at

In executive session the person who might be degraded,

defamed or incriminated was entitled to appear and be heard, and to
call a reasonable number of witnesses on his behalf.
The Supreme Court specifically noted that the Louisiana
statute had been drafted with the Court's decision in Hannah in
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mind.

This meant that the Louisiana Legislature had attempted to

characterize the Commission as an investigatory body so that the
more rigorous procedural safeguards applicable to accusatory bodies
would not be required in the Commisssion's proceedings.

However,

the Court concluded that its earlier decision in Hannah was not
controlling in Jenkins because of substantial factual differences
between the two cases.
Whereas the Court in Hannah found the function of the
Commission on Civil Rights to be a purely legislative and
fact-finding one, it found that the function of the Commission of
Inquiry in Jenkins was limited to criminal law violations.

The

Court observed that "everything in the Act points to the fact that
it is concerned only with exposing violations of criminal laws by
specific individuals."

Jenkins, supra, 395 U.S. at 427, 423 L. Ed.

2d at 420. The Court in a plurality opinion7 concluded that due
process at least required the rights of confrontation, crossexamination and presentation of evidence, but left to the lower
court in the first instance the responsibility to determine the
extent of the procedural safeguards to be employed.

Id., 395 U.S.

at 430, 23 L. Ed. 2d at 421-22.

In addition to the three justices who joined in the plurality opinion,
Justices Black and Douglas, who had dissented in Hannah, only concurred in
the result in Jenkins because the opinion did not go far enough. Jenkins,
supra, 395 U.S at 432-33, 23 L. Ed. 2d at 423. Both Justices Black and
Douglas believed that the commissions• proceedings in both Hannah and Jenkins
clearly violated due process.

-17-

3.

The Hannah/McKeithen Analysis Pinpoints the
Glaring Due Process Deficiencies of the
Mini-Grand Jury Act.
The accusatory function performed by prosecutors under the

Mini-Grand Jury Act is even more clear cut than that of the
Commission of Inquiry in Jenkins.

Whereas the Commission of

Inquiry commenced proceedings only upon referral from the Governor
and thereafter made recommendations to others that prosecutions be
instituted, prosecutors under the Mini-Grand Jury Act determine
themselves who will be investigated and actually conduct the
prosecutions.

There is no provision in the Act stating that the

Attorney General or county attorneys should make findings to be
presented to the Legislature, the Governor or other executive
officers.

The Attorney General or county attorneys do not need to

make findings and then turn them over to some disinterested party
or prosecuting entity to determine whether a criminal prosecution
should be instituted because they are the prosecutors.
solely an accusatory function.
that role.

Theirs is

They are specifically trained for

They use the Act as a vehicle for the specific purpose

of gathering evidence to support the criminal charges they intend
to instigate.

If they can gather sufficient evidence to justify

commencing a criminal prosecution, the criminal prosecution will be
started.
As demonstrated by the plain language of the Mini-Grand
Jury Act itself in section 77-22-2(1), and as conceded by the
Attorney General, M[t]he only limitation existing in this statute
is that crime or malfeasance in office be investigated."
-18-

Appellant's Brief at 21. The declaration in section 77-22-1 states
that the Act's purpose in part is "to prevent criminal suspects
from having access to information prior to prosecution and to
clarify the power of the attorney general and county attorneys to
errant immunity from prosecution to witnesses whose testimony is
essential to the proper conduct of a criminal investigation or
prosecution."

(Emphasis added).

In view of that explicit language

declaring the purposes of the Act, it is wholly specious to suggest
that proceedings under the Act are of no different character than
those purely investigative activities of legislative committees,
administrative agencies or presidential commissions.
Notwithstanding the fact that prosecutors under the Act
are much more certainly "accusers" than the Commission of Inquiry
was, the Louisiana statute provided more procedural protections to
witnesses than the Mini-Grand Jury Act does.

The Louisiana statute

(1) required notice to be given of the general subject matter of
the investigation, (2) permitted counsel to ask questions of their
own clients and to submit proposed questions to be asked of other
witnesses, and (3) under certain circumstances, allowed persons
under investigation to be heard and to call witnesses on their
behalf.

The Mini-Grand Jury Act, in contrast, only permits a

witness to be accompanied by counsel.
D.

The Mini-Grand Jury Act Fails To Even Guarantee The
Key Procedural Safeguards Provided In Statutes And
Regulations Governing Purely Investigative Subpoenas.
Assuming for purposes of argument only that investigative

proceedings under the Mini-Grand Jury Act were of the same
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character as those conducted by administrative agencies or
legislative committees, then it stands to reason that the witnesses
or subjects of criminal investigations being subpoenaed pursuant to
the Act are entitled to the same procedural safeguards that are
extended to witnesses or subjects of administrative investigations.
However, significant disparities exist between the procedural
safeguards afforded to witnesses subpoenaed pursuant to the
Mini-Grand Jury Act and those subpoenaed pursuant to federal or
some state administrative statutes.

The Mini-Grand Jury Act does

not even provide all the essential procedural safeguards that are
present in many statutes and regulations governing purely
investigative or administrative subpoenas such as notice of the
nature and scope of the investigation, the opportunity to challenge
in court the validity and reasonableness of a subpoena, and the
right to assert the privilege against self-incrimination.
Careful analysis shows that Walling, supra, which the
Attorney General cites frequently as authority for his arguments,
actually undercuts the Attorney General's position that the Act
offers adequate judicial supervision.

Essential to the Court's

decision in Walling was the fact that judicial involvement was
expressly provided for by statute before any adverse consequences
affected individual rights.

In Walling, the Court reviewed

judgments from the Third and Tenth Circuits in which those courts
either affirmed or directed the respective district courts to enter
orders requiring two publishing companies to comply with subpoenas
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duces tecum issued by the Wage Hour Administrator in the course of
an investigation into the applicability and violations of the Fair
Labor Standards Act.

In both instances, the Supreme Court affirmed

the judgments of the courts of appeals that the publishing
companies must comply with the subpoenas duces tecum.

To

understand why the decision and reasoning of the Court in Walling
undermine the Attorney General's position, the subpoena power
provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act must be reviewed.
Section 9 of the Fair Labor Standards Act (29 U.S.C.
S 209) makes sections 9 and 10 (15 U.S.C. SS 49, 50) of the Federal
Trade Commission Act, relating to the attendance of witnesses and
production of books, papers and documents, applicable to investigations and hearings provided for under the Fair Labor Standards
Act.

The crucial point here is that section 9 of the Federal Trade

Commission Act specifically required the commission to turn to a
federal district court for enforcement of any subpoena.

See

Walling, supra, 317 U.S. at 200 n.24, 90 L. Ed. at 624 n.24. An
enforcement action begun in federal district court involved both
notice and hearing and therefore assured the right to any
subpoenaed party to raise its objections to the subpoena.

It was

this statutorily prescribed judicial involvement before compliance
with the subpoena that preserved the constitutionality of the
procedure.

The Court's opinion in Walling repeatedly emphasized

that the compliance order was proper because the courts, not the
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Administrator, had reviewed the s i t u a t i o n and found no abuse or
lack of authority in the issuance of the subpoenas. 1
The Supreme Court in Hannah, supra, observed that in the
i n v e s t i g a t i v e (not adjudicative) proceedings held by the Federal
Trade Commission, persons summoned to appear are e n t i t l e d under the
Commission's rules to general notice of the purpose and scope of
the investigation. I d . , 363 U.S. at 446, 4 L. Ed. 2d at 1323.

*The following e x c e r p t s from the Court's opinion i n Walling, supra, confirm
t h a t a c t i v e j u d i c i a l supervison of the subpoena requests had occurred:
[1] No o f f i c e r or other person has sought to enter
p e t i t i o n e r ' s premises a g a i n s t t h e i r w i l l , to search them, or
to s e i z e or examine t h e i r books, records or papers without
t h e i r a s s e n t , otherwise than pursuant to order of court
authorized by law and made a f t e r adequate opportunity to
present o b j e c t i o n s , which i n f a c t were made. Nor has any
o b j e c t i o n been taken to the breadth of the subpoena or to any
other s p e c i f i c d e f e c t which would i n v a l i d a t e them.
I d . , 327 U.S. a t 195, 90 L. Ed. a t 622 ( f o o t n o t e omitted) (emphasis
added)•
[2] . . . [Rjequiring them to submit t h e i r pertinent records
for the Administrator's i n s p e c t i o n under every j u d i c i a l
safeguard, a f t e r and only a f t e r an order of court made
pursuant t o and i n exact compliance with authority granted by
Congress.
I d . , 327 U.S. a t 196, 90 L. Ed. a t 622 (emphasis added).
[3] The Administrator i s authorized t o enter and i n s p e c t , but
the Act makes h i s r i g h t t o do so s u b j e c t in a l l cases to
j u d i c i a l s u p e r v i s i o n . Persons from whom he seeks r e l e v a n t
information are not required to submit t o h i s demand, i f i n
any r e s p e c t i t i s unreasonable or overreaches the a u t h o r i t y
Congress has g i v e n . To i t they may make "appropriate defense"
surrounded by every safeguard of j u d i c i a l r e s t r a i n t .
I d . , 327 U.S. a t 217, 90 L. Ed. at 634 (emphasis added).

•22-

Since Walling was decided, new legislation has been enacted
specifically dealing with civil investigative demands initiated by
the Federal Trade Commission.

15 U.S.C 5 57b-l(c)(l) does not

require court approval before issuance of such investigative
demands, but subsection (c)(2) states:

"Each civil investigative

demand shall state the nature of the conduct constituting the
alleged violation which is under investigation and the provisions
of law applicable to such violation."
Besides providing for the right to counsel (subsection
(c)(12)(D)(i)) and an express right to assert the privilege
against self-incrimination or any other privilege (subsection
(c)(12)(D)(ii)), the statute allows a person upon whom a civil
investigative demand has been served by a commission investigator
to file with the commission a petition for an order modifying or
setting aside the demand (subsection (f)). Finally, the commission
is required to petition an appropriate federal district court for
enforcement of its investigative demands if a person fails to
comply or otherwise challenges the demand (subsection (e)).
The subpoena provision of the Federal Administrative
Procedure Act, which applies to most federal administrative
agencies, expressly notifies interested parties of their right to
challenge a subpoena:
Agency subpoenas authorized by law shall
be issued to a party on request and, when
required by rules of procedure, on a statement
or showing of general relevance and reasonable
scope of the evidence sought. On contest, the
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court shall sustain the subpoena or similar
process or demand to the extent that it is
found to be in accordance with law. In a
proceeding for enforcement, the court shall
issue an order requiring the appearance of the
witness or the production of the evidence or
data within a reasonable time under penalty of
punishment for contempt in case of contumacious
failure to comply.
5 U.S.C. § 555(d) (emphasis added).

Although the statute does not

expressly state the type of notice, if any, that must be given to
subpoenaed witnesses, the rules of practice followed by many of the
agencies notify the witnesses as to the nature and scope of the
investigation.

See, e.g., Appendix to the Opinion of the Court in

Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 454-485, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1307, 1328-52,
80 S. Ct. 1502 (1960).

The Attorney General c i t e s the case of In re Investigation
No. 2 of Governor's Organized Crime Prevention Commission, 577 P.2d
414 (N.M. 1978), to support the proposition that investigatory
subpoenas issued by him are to be equated with administrative
subpoenas. 9

A brief comparison of the provisions of the

Mini-Grand Jury Act with those of the New Mexico Organized Crime
Act, as amended, § 39-1-1 et s e q . , N.M.S.A. 1953 (Supp. 1975 &
Inter. Supp. 1976-77), c l e a r l y shows that even i f subpoenas issued
by the Attorney General were t o be considered the same as

f

I t i s noteworthy that the Supreme Court of New Mexico in determining that
subpoenas issued by the Governor's Organized Crime Prevention Commission were
administrative subpoenas, f i r s t determined that the Commission was an
investigatory rather than an accusatory body. Id. at 415. Thus, i t used the
same analysis employed by the Supreme Court in Hannah and Jenkins, supra.
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administrative subpoenas, the Mini-Grand Jury Act does not provide
nearly as many procedural safeguards as the New Mexico statute
does.

The following excerpts from the New Mexico Supreme Court's

opinion identifies the significant differences:
Under the Act the Legislature provided that
the Commission must petition the district court
to obtain a subpoena. The district court must
determine whether the investigation is within the
power of the Commission, whether the subpoena is
definite enough and whether the material sought
is reasonably relevant. What is reasonably
relevant depends on the nature and purpose of the
investigation and relevancy cannot be determined
in the absence of a stated purpose. Once the
purpose is ascertained it must be shown that the
material sought has a logical relation to the
purpose of the investigation. . . .
After a subpoena is issued the individual or
institution upon whom it is served has an
opportunity to challenge it. The subpoenas
issued under the Act ask only for voluntary
compliance. Under § 39-9-4 D, N.M.S.A. 1953
(Inter. Supp. 1976-77) of the Act the Commission
is authorized to go to any district court to seek
enforcement of the subpoena. The Legislature
must have contemplated that the subpoenaed person
would be allowed to show at that hearing why the
subpoena should not be enforced.
Id. at 416 (emphasis added).
The very authority cited by the Attorney General to
buttress his arguments shows the inconsistency of his position.
contrast, UP&L's position is sound:

In

Criminal investigations

conducted by the Attorney General under the Act are accusatory
rather than investigatory in nature.

However, even if this Court

should determine that the Attorney General's exercise of subpoena
powers pursuant to the Act is investigatory in nature and therefore

-25-

comparable to administrative subpoenas, then witnesses are entitled
to at least the same procedural safeguards that are extended to
witnesses served with administrative subpoenas.
E.

The Opportunity For A Pre-Compliance Challenge To A
Subpoena Is Meaningless Unless Witnesses Are Notified
Of The Nature And Scope Of The Investigation.
Without at least the guarantee that witnesses subpoenaed

by the Attorney General will be informed as to the nature and scope
of the investigation, the alleged opportunity for a pre-compliance
challenge to the subpoena is meaningless.

Even assuming for the

moment that Walling were controlling here, which is the assumption
upon which the Attorney General proceeds, the Supreme Court's
opinion states that the scope of the inquiry must be known to
determine the reasonableness of a subpoena:
[T]he requirement of reasonableness . . . comes
down to specification of the documents to be
produced adequate, but not excessive, for the
purposes of the relevant inquiry. Necessarily,
as has been said, this cannot be reduced to
formula; for relevancy and adequacy or excess in
the breadth of the subpoena are matters variable
in relation to the nature, purposes and scope of
the inquiry.
Id., 327 U.S. at 209, 90 L. Ed. at 630 (footnote omitted).
Inasmuch as the Attorney General maintains that the "burden of
persuasion" as to both the relevancy and adequate specification
requirements are upon the party challenging the subpoena, see
Appellant's Brief at 24, a party subpoenaed by the Attorney General
under the Act is in the precarious situation of bearing the burden
of having to show that a subpoena is irrelevant or excessive
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without knowing the nature, purposes or scope of the criminal
investigation as originally approved by the district court.
Neither relevance nor reasonableness can be determined
in a vacuum.

A party can make a reasoned and intelligent decision

whether to comply with or challenge a subpoena duces tecum only if
it knows the nature and scope of the investigation pursuant to
which the subpoena was issued.

For example. Judge Bunnell pointed

out that "[a] previous subpoena issued by the Attorney General's
Office attempted to get into Utah Power and Light Company's
dealings in uranium mining, when in fact the original Good Cause
Affidavit mentioned no indication of any criminal dealing in this
area."

Memorandum Decision at 2.
Judge Bunnell alluded to the statutory requirement that

the Attorney General or a county attorney apply to and obtain the
approval of a district court, for good cause shown, to conduct a
criminal investigation.

Utah Code Ann. S 77-22-1(1).

The

Mini-Grand Jury Act also authorizes the district court upon
application of the prosecutor to issue a secrecy order which was
done here.

Id. at S 77-22-2(3).

Since the good cause showing is

the prosecutor's declaration to the court of the justification(s)
for allowing the criminal investigation and delineates the nature
and scope of the investigation, a subpoenaed party has no basis for
determining the appropriateness of the subpoena duces tecum unless
it is informed as to the nature and scope of the investigation.
Because the Act does not require the prosecutor to disclose to the
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witness the nature and scope of the investigation, the party's only
hope of discovering the nature and scope of the investigation is if
it is granted by the court an opportunity to review the good cause
showing.

However, the Act makes no provision for such an

examination.
Judge Bunnell, in a dialogue with one of the Assistant
Attorneys General about the operation of his order that the
Attorney General could not use the criminal investigation to
venture into civil matters or to explore matters beyond the good
cause showing, expressed during the May 30, 1984 hearing his
uncertainty and frustration over the procedure that should be
followed to permit a party to challenge a subpoena:
But I think the nature and scope would be
those general terms that you've used in your
good cause order.
There's one point in this statute that
bothers me a little bit, you see, and that is
when does an accused get the opportunity to
challenge what I've just ordered. Because he's
never allowed to see the good cause order or
its content unless you come in, I guess, and
make application to make it known to him. I
don't know. You see, on search and seizure,
all that's available,' the affidavit, whether
hte [sic] officer saw the guy do it and swears
to it, and the Courts review it to see whether
he's right. This thing—it troubles me a
little that we don't allow anybody to see that
that's being investigated. So he never
knows. . . .
Transcript of May 30, 1984 Hearing before Judge Bunnell at 46-47.
Judge Bunnell assumed that an in camera inspection of the
original good cause showing might be available.
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He reasoned by

analogy to search and seizure procedures that such a safeguard
should be available. An Assistant Attorney General, without citing
any provision in the Act or other authority, then suggested that in
camera inspection was clearly available.

Id. at 47-48. Judge

Bunnell simply concluded: "That could be possible.

If they want to

see it, perhaps they could petition and maybe we'll let you see it,
Mr. Nebeker and Mr. Holbrook."

Id. at 48.

If the very judges who

are called upon to interpret the Act and protect the rights of
individuals cannot ascertain with confidence the manner in which
the Act is to operate and cannot define the procedural safeguards
to which a person is entitled under the Act, then it defies reason
and makes a mockery of due process to claim that such a statute
provides the ordinary citizen who is unschooled in the law with an
effective pre-compliance opportunity to challenge a subpoena.
Perhaps the most insidious aspect of the Attorney
General's argument that a motion to quash is a sufficient remedy
against a denial of constitutional rights is that such a system
would place upon individual citizens the economic and legal burden
of policing the state's use of its power.

Our constitutional

system was designed to insure just the opposite result.

The vast

resources and compulsive powers of government may be levelled
against individuals only in carefully defined ways.

They may not

be unleashed without regard for individual rights until held
accountable by citizens who wade through the judicial process to
obtain relief.

The Constitution prohibits the government from
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doing certain things to citizens and dictates that other things be
done only within carefully drawn limits.

The only effective

pre-compliance safeguard against abuses by prosecutors is the
Constitution itself, not a motion to quash.

II.

UTAH LAW REQUIRES THAT WITNESSES SUBPOENAED TO TESTIFY IN A
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION BE ADVISED OF THEIR RIGHT AGAINST
SELF-INCRIMINATION AND BE INFORMED IF THEY ARE OR WHEN
THEY BECOME TARGETS.
Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution establishes

the right against self-incrimination and states in pertinent part:
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall
have the right to appear and defend in person and
by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a copy
thereof, . . . The accused shall not be compelled
to give evidence against himself; . . . .
(Emphasis added).

Whereas the Fifth Amendment to the United States

Constitution guarantees that "[n]o person . . . shall be compelled
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself," the Utah
Constitution provides that an accused "shall not be compelled to
give evidence against himself."

(Emphasis added).

The distinction

is significant because the Utah constitutional privilege is broader
in its protection than the Fifth Amendment in that it does not
require an accused to give "evidence" (implies either testimonial
or tangible evidence) against himself whereas the Fifth Amendment
only protects a person from having to be a "witness" (implies
testimonial evidence alone) against himself.
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See State v.

McCumber, 622 P.2d 353, 358 (Utah 1980); Hansen v. Owens, 619 P.2d
315, 316-17 (Utah 1980).

Thus, under the Utah Constitution one

cannot be compelled to produce books, records, documents or papers
that would incriminate himself.
A.

The Privilege Against Compelled Self-incrimination
Applies To Criminal Investigations.
In detailing the breadth of the privilege against

self-incrimination, the United States Supreme Court stated in In re
Gault, 387 U.S. I, 18 L. Ed. 2d 527, 87 S. Ct. 1428 (1967):
The privilege can be claimed in any
proceeding, be it criminal or civil,
administrative or judicial, investigatory or
adjudicatory . . . it protects any disclosures
which the witness may reasonably apprehend could
be used in a criminal prosecution or which could
lead to other evidence that might be so used.
id. 387 U.S. at 47-48, 18 L. Ed. 2d 527, 557 (emphasis in the
original) guoting Murphy v. Waterfront Commission of New York
Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 94, 12 L. Ed. 2d 678, 704, 84 S. Ct. 1594
(1964) (White, J., concurring).

That same principle has since been

reaffirmed in Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 464, 42 L. Ed. 2d
574, 587, 95 S. Ct. 584 (1975), and in Kastigar v. United States,
406 U.S. 441, 444, 32 L. Ed. 2d 212, 92 S. Ct. 1653 (1972).

The

Utah Supreme Court has stated that the Utah constitutional
privilege against compelled self-incrimination applies to grand
jury proceedings.
973 (1967).

State v. Ruggeri, 19 Utah 2d 216, 429 P.2d 969,

The Utah Legislature later codified that rule by

enacting Utah Code Ann. S 77-11-3.
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B.

Under Utah Law A Subpoenaed Person Has The Right
To Be Informed That He Is A Target Of A Criminal
Investigation.
The respective courts of last resort have interpreted both

the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of Utah
to extend the right against self-incrimination to criminal
investigations.

As an added protection, under Utah law, the

subject of a criminal investigation when compelled to give evidence
against himself must be advised that he is a target of the
investigation.

The rationale underlying the target warning

requirement is that unless a potential defendant is advised that
charges might be brought against him, he is not in the position to
make an informed and intelligent decision about exercising his
right to assert the privilege against self-incrimination.
The leading Utah Supreme Court case on the duty of
prosecutors to disclose to witnesses who are compelled to testify
that they are targets of a criminal investigation is State v.
Ruggeri, 19 Utah 2d 216, 429 P.2d 969 (1967).

In Ruggeri, the

State of Utah sought an extraordinary writ in the nature of
mandamus to compel a state district court judge to reverse his
holding and admit into evidence testimony that he had ruled to be
inadmissible.

Judge Ruggeri, in a matter before him, had granted

defendant's motion to suppress testimony given before a grand jury.
C. W. Brady, a county commissioner, had been criticized
publicly for paying more in rentals on a bit paving machine than it
would have cost to buy a new machine.
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Brady was summoned to appear

before a grand jury, at which time he requested the assistance of
counsel. Utah law at that time precluded the presence of counsel
in the grand jury room.

Brady did not know at the time that he was

the target of the grand jury investigation.

He was subsequently

indicted, along with others, on a criminal conspiracy charge and
also was indicted for perjury.
In refusing to issue the requested extraordinary writ, the
Utah Supreme Court stated in a plurality opinion:
However, one being investigated for crime
is not just a witness and cannot be treated as
such. The target of an investigation is an
accused within the meaning of the Constitution,
and when he is detained in any significant way,
he may not be interrogated unless he is advised
of the charges against him then under
consideration. To fail to so warn one so
being investigated is to entrap him and to
violate his constitutional privilege against
self-incrimination.
Whether the examination needed to be
terminated when Brady requested counsel need not
be decided, for we think it was improper to call
him in the first place when the purpose was to
secure testimony from his own lips to be used
against him in a trial which would result from
the proposed indictment.
Id. at 973 (emphasis added).

Although the quoted language appears

in what is styled as a plurality opinion consisting of two
justices, an additional justice who concurred in the result stated
in his concurring opinion that he agreed with the plurality in
their reasoning on this point.10

10

Justice Ellett authored the plurality opinion in which Justice Tuckett
concurred. Then-Chief Justice Crockett authored a specially concurring
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The two j u s t i c e s concurring s p e c i a l l y echoed the statements
in the p l u r a l i t y opinion t o the e f f e c t that Brady should have been
informed that he was a suspect in the criminal investigation.
Then-Chief Justice Crockett wrote in h i s special concurrence:
But the important point in my mind i s that
the d i s t r i c t attorney and the grand jury knew of
the possible implications of crime and the
questions being asked, while Brady did not.
Insofar as i t i s shown in t h i s record, the
questioning of Mr. Brady appears to have been
part of a sort of general inquiry to discover
possible misdoings in county government. But
there was no indication to him that he was
suspected of any crime, what any such suspected
crime may have been, nor what connection he or
the testimony e l i c i t e d might have with i t . He
therefore would not have any basis for knowing
how the statements he was making might relate t o
any particular crime, nor whether they might
implicate him therein,

10

Continued:

opinion in which Justice Callister concurred. Of particular importance i s the
opinion of Justice Henroid that i s designated as "concurring in the result."
Howeverf the actual language of Justice Henroid's opinion reveals that he
concurred in more than the result. Justice Henroid stated at the outset of
his opinion:
I concur in the r e s u l t , and in the reasoning of Mr.
Justice E l l e t t , except that 1 think those cases cited
anent extraordinary writs do not apply in this particular
case.
State v. Ruggeri, 19 Utah 2d 216, 429 P.2d 969, 977 (1967) (emphasis added).
The c r i t i c a l language in Justice E l l e t t ' s opinion that bears on the issues in
this case does not relate at a l l to extraordinary writs. Hence, Justice
Henroidvs statement that he concurred also in the reasoning of Justice E l l e t t ,
except as i t related to extraordinary writs, indicates that those portions of
Justice E l l e t t ' s opinion not relating to extraordinary writs command a
majority of the Court and are not just a plurality position.
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To avoid being misunderstood, I interpose
this observation: I have no doubt that if a
person testifying before a grand jury falsifies
concerning a material matter he can be convicted
of perjury. But the proceedings should be
carried on properly and with due regard for the
constitutional rights of the witness. If his
rights of non-incrimnation and to have counsel
are to be meaningful, they should be made
available in a practical way when they are
needed. The witness should be made sufficiently
aware of the situation he faces that he is able
to make an informed and deliberate choice whether
to waive or to claim those rights. In that
regard it seems to me that a sense of fairness
and justice on the part of the district attorney
and/or the grand jury would suggest that when
the witness is or becomes the target of an
investigation for a particular crime he should be
so advised and afforded an opportunity to invoke
his constitutional rights if he so desires. Cf.
Escobedo v. State of Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84
S. Ct. 1758, 12 L. Ed 2d 977. There is no
indication that this was done here.
Id. at 976 (emphasis added).

Regardless of any differences

in the underlying reasoning, there was agreement among all five
justices of the Utah Supreme Court on at least the single point that
a subpoenaed witness should be informed if he is or becomes the
target of a criminal investigation.
Some years after the Utah Supreme Court's decision in
Ruggeri, the prevailing rule of law on target warnings was codified
by the Utah Legislature in 1980. Utah Code Ann. S 77-11-3(2),
relating to the rights of witnesses summoned to appear before grand
juries, states in relevant part:
(2) Any person called to testify before the
grand jury may be advised of his right to be
represented by counsel. If a witness is or
becomes a subject of the investigation, he shall
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be advised of that fact and of his right to
counsel, and of his privilege against
self-incrimination. . • •
(Emphasis added).

Thus, the necessity of giving target warnings in

grand jury proceedings and, UP&L believes, in any criminal
investigative proceeding, is clearly established in Utah.

XIX.

THE SAME PROCEDURAL PROTECTIONS ACCORDED TO PERSONS SUBPOENAED
TO TESTIFY BEFORE A GRAND JURY MUST BE EXTENDED TO PERSONS
SUBPOENAED TO TESTIFY UNDER THE MINI-GRAND JURY ACT.
The Attorney General in advancing his argument that

subpoenas issued under the Mini-Grand Jury Act should be equated
with administrative subpoenas seizes upon language from Oklahoma
Press Publishing Company v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 90 L. Ed. 614,
66 S. Ct. 494 (1946), suggesting that grand jury proceedings are
comparable to administrative investigatory proceedings.

UP&L does

not dispute the proposition that many administrative agencies
perform an investigative function that in some respects is similar
to that of the grand jury, see id., 327 U.S. at 216, 90 L. Ed. at
634, but maintains that the grand jury definitely fulfills an
accusatory function that is aided by its investigatory activities.
The United States Supreme Court in Jenkins v. McKeithen,
395 U.S. 411, 23 L. Ed. 2d 404, 89 S. Ct. 1843 (1969), discussed
the due process procedural safeguards that should be available
before bodies that perform an accusatory function.

After

reaffirming that whether a particular procedural right obtains in
a specific proceeding depends upon a number of factors, the Court
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focused on the special role of the grand jury that is
constitutionally sanctioned:
We do not mean to say that this same
analysis applies to every body which has an
accusatory function. The grand jury, for
example, need not provide all the procedural
guarantees alleged by appellant to be
applicable to the Commission. As this Court
noted in Hannah, "the grand jury merely
investigates and reports. It does not try."
Moreover, "[t]he functions of that institution
and its constitutional prerogatives are rooted
in long centuries of Anglo-American history."
Finally the grand jury is designed to interpose
an independent body of citizens between the
accused and the prosecuting attorney and the
court. Investigative bodies such as the
Commission have no claim to specific
constitutional sanction.
Id., 395 U.S. at 430-31, 23 L. Ed. 2d at 422 (citations omitted).
The Attorney General's willingness to draw parallels
between grand jury proceedings and proceedings under the Mini-Grand
Jury Act dissipates when the discussion turns to the critical
procedural safeguards of advising witnesses of the privilege
against self-incrimination and giving target warnings.

It already

has been discussed that Utah Code Ann. § 77-11-3(2) codifies the
Ruggeri rule by requiring that M[i]f a witness is or becomes a
subject of the investigation, he shall be advised of that fact and
of his right to counsel, and of his privilege against
self-incrimination."

Whereas those safeguards are expressly

provided for in grand jury proceedings, they are conspicuously
absent from the provisions of the Mini-Grand Jury Act.
A.

The Equal Protection Provision Of The
Constitution Of Utah Requires That An Accused
Receive The Same Procedural Protections
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Regardless Of The Manner In Which The Prosecution
Is Commenced,
UP&L contends that under Utah constitutional law the same
procedural safeguards extended t o those suspected of criminal
offenses that are investigated by a grand jury must be granted
those investigated pursuant t o the Mini-Grand Jury Act.

A brief

comparison of prosecution by indictment v i s - a - v i s prosecution by
information reveals why an accused under either procedure should be
e n t i t l e d to a parity of protections.

F i r s t , unlike the federal

Constitution, the Constitution of Utah s p e c i f i c a l l y provides for
alternative i n i t i a l tracks for prosecution.

Article I, section 13

of the Constitution of Utah s t a t e s :
Offenses heretofore required to be
prosecuted by indictment, shall be prosecuted
by information after examination and commitment
by a magistrate, unless the examination be
waived by the accused with the consent of the
State, or by indictment, with or without such
examination and commitment. The formation of
the grand jury and the powers and duties
thereof shall be prescribed by the Legislature.
Moreoever, the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure place prosecution
by indictment or information on a parity with each o t h e r . 1 1

ll

Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, relating to the
prosecution of public offenses, states in part:
(a) Unless otherwise provided, a l l offenses shall be
prosecuted by indictment or information sworn to by a person
having reason to believe the offense has been committed.
(b) An indictment or information shall charge the offense
for which the defendant i s being prosecuted by using the
name given the offense by common law or by statute or by
stating in concise terms the definition of the offense
sufficient to give the defendant notice of the charge. . . .
Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-4.

Even the statutory definitions of "Indictment" and "Information"
both define each in part as "an accusation, in writing."

Utah Code

Ann- S 77-1-3 (2), (3).
Given the fact that prosecutions by indictment or by
information are on an equal constitutional and statutory footing,
the immense disparity between procedural protections afforded an
accused, which disparity is solely a function of the form the
prosecution takes, raises serious constitutional issues. The
Constitution of Utah contains its own equal protection clause which
provides:

"All political power is inherent in the people; and all

free governments are founded on their authority for their equal
protection and benefit, and they have the right to alter or reform
their government as the public welfare may require."

Utah Const,

art. I, S 2.
A comparison of the equal protection language from the
state constitution with that from the federal Constitution which
states, "nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws," suggests that the wording of the state
constitution is broader.

The phrase "equal protection of the laws"

from the federal Constitution has given rise to the rational
relationship test, i.e., the traditional analysis of whether there
is any rational basis justifying the unequal operation of a
particular law upon different classes of persons.
Nothing in the wording of the Utah equal protection
constitutional provision indicates that it should be confined to
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the 6ame interpretations given the federal constitutional
provision.

The more expansive language in the Constitution of Utah

simply states that free governments are founded upon the authority
of the people for their equal protection.

Free governments are

founded on the authority of all the people, including those who
have been or might be accused of wrongdoing.

Certainly each person

accused by a prosecutor of a particular offense should be entitled
to the same protections afforded others accused of the same
offense, albeit the accusations against others are presented by a
grand jury.

UP&L maintains that article I, section 13 of the

Constitution of Utah, as presently applied through the derivative
legislation thereto, impacts discriminatorily upon that class of
accused persons for which the State elects to prosecute by means of
an information and for which the State has gathered evidence by
means of subpoenas or subpoenas duces tecum issued pursuant to the
Mini-Grand Jury Act.
The current state of the law in Utah assures an accused
prosecuted pursuant to a grand jury indictment that he will receive
a target warning and be informed of his right to counsel and the
privilege against self-incrimination.

By contrast, the Act only

guarantees an accused prosecuted pursuant to an information that he
will be advised of his right to counsel.

It is wholly within the

discretion of the state's prosecutors to determine which
prosecution track will be used.

This is the very arbitrariness and

capriciousness that the constitution abhors and that equal
protection was designed to eradicate.
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B.

The Mini-Grand Jury Act Violates The Due Process
Clause Of The Constitution Of Utah Because It Does
Not Require Prosecutors To Notify Witnesses Of The
Purpose Of The Inquiry.
Another basis for requiring parity of procedural

protections comes from the Constitution of Utah's due process
clause which closely tracks the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States and states:

"No person shall be

deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of
law." Utah Const, art. I, S 7. The leading case of this Court
interpreting article I, section 7 of the Constitution of Utah is
Christiansen v. Harris, 109 Utah 1, 163 P.2d 314 (1945).

This

Court's extended discussion in Harris of procedural due process
guarantees arose during its consideration of the procedural
formalities necessary to sustain a district court's revocation of
probation.

In concluding that one of the essentials of due process

in depriving one of life or liberty is "notice to the person of the
inauguration and purpose of the inquiry and the time at which such
person should appear if he wishes to be heard," this Court stated:
Some rules affecting all types [of proceedings], are not found in the statutes, but
in that great basic body of the law commonly
known as the decisions or rules of the courts.
But all these methods and means provided for
the protection and enforcement of human rights
have the same basic requirements—that no party
can be affected by such action, until his legal
rights have been the subject of an inquiry by a
person or body authorized by law to determine
such rights, of which inquiry the party has due
notice, and at which he had an opportunity to
be heard and to give evidence as to his rights
or defenses.

-41-

Id. at 317 (emphasis added).

It should be s e l f - e v i d e n t that the

l i b e r t y of a person who i s the subject of a criminal i n v e s t i g a t i o n
i s in jeopardy.

The criminal investigation i s a preliminary but

integral part of the prosecution by which one i s p o t e n t i a l l y
deprived of h i s l i b e r t y .
Notwithstanding UP&L's argument that an accused should be
afforded the same procedural protections regardless of whether the
investigation i s by means of a grand jury or a prosecutor, i f any
disparity of treatment were to be sanctioned, there i s at l e a s t one
compelling reason why greater protections should be afforded t o
those compelled to give evidence to prosecutors.

As previously

noted, the grand jury system places an independent body of c i t i z e n s
between the accused and the prosecutor during the period in which
the investigation proceeds and during which the determination i s
made whether to return an indictment. 1 2

12

The United S t a t e s Supreme Court i n Ex Parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1 , 1 1 , 30 L.
Ed. 849, 8 5 2 - 5 3 , 7 S. Ct. 781 ( 1 8 8 7 ) f elaborated on the importance of the
grand j u r y ' s independent r o l e :
Yet the i n s t i t u t i o n [the grand jury] was adopted i n t h i s
country, and i s continued from c o n s i d e r a t i o n s s i m i l a r t o
those which g i v e to i t i t s chief value i n England, and i s
designed as a means, not only of bringing to t r i a l persons
accused of public offences upon j u s t grounds, but a l s o as a
means of p r o t e c t i n g the c i t i z e n a g a i n s t unfounded a c c u s a t i o n ,
whether i t comes from government, or be prompted by p a r t i s a n
passion or p r i v a t e enmity. No person s h a l l be required,
according to the fundamental law of the country, except i n
the cases mentioned, to answer for any of the higher crimes
u n l e s s t h i s body, c o n s i s t i n g of not l e s s than s i x t e e n nor
more than twenty-three good and lawful men, s e l e c t e d from the
body of the d i s t r i c t , s h a l l d e c l a r e , upon careful
d e l i b e r a t i o n , under the solemnity of an o a t h , that there i s
good reason for h i s accusation and t r i a l .
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By contrast, no independent person or group is interposed
between the accused and the prosecutor during the period of the
investigation and while a determination is made by the prosecutor
to file an information.

It is true that the information may be

reviewed by a magistrate who is an independent party, but by that
point in time evidence incriminating the accused already may have
been illegally obtained by the prosecutor.

That possibility raises

again the importance of informing a person that he is or has become
a subject of the investigation so that he can make an intelligent
and informed decision whether to exercise the privilege against
self-incrimination.

Although tainted evidence in the search and

seizure context may be excluded at trial, the Mini-Grand Jury Act
in this instance, as in so many others, makes no provision for such
a procedure.
C.

The Act Should Be Declared Unconstitutional Under the
Due Process Void-For-Vagueness Doctrine.
This Court has stated that decisions r e l a t i n g t o the Fifth

and Fourteenth Amendments t o the United States Constitution are
highly persuasive when interpreting the due process clause of the
Utah constitution.

Vali Convalescent & Care I n s t i t u t i o n v.

Industrial Commission of Utah, 649 P.2d 33, 35-36 (Utah 1982).
The United States Supreme Court in a l i n e of c a s e s 1 3 has

**See, e . g . , Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 f 75 L. Ed. 2d 903, 103 S. Ct.
1855 (1983); Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates. I n c . ,
455 U.S. 489, 71 L. Ed. 2d 362, 102 S. Ct. 1186 (1982); Smith v. Goguen,
415 U.S. 566, 39 L. Ed. 2d 605, 94 S. Ct. 1242 (1974); Grayned v. City of
Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 33 L. Ed. 2d 222, 92 S. Ct. 2294 (1972).
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developed the void-for-vagueness doctrine which "requires that a
penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient
definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is
prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement."

Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352,

, 75 L. Ed. 2d 903, 909, 103 S. Ct. 1855 (1983).
As was the case in Kolender, statutes that run afoul of
the void-for-vagueness doctrine typically are held to be
unconstitutional on their face.

Id., 461 U.S. at

, 75 L. Ed.

2d at 911. The touchstone for maintaining a facial challenge to a
law is that it reaches "a substantial amount of constitutionally
protected conduct."

Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside,

Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494, 71 L. Ed. 2d 362, 369,
102 S. Ct. 1186 (1982).

Although the constitutionally protected

activity that is ordinarily infringed upon involves the First
Amendment rights of free speech and association, other conduct is
also constitutionally protected.

In Kolender, for example, the

Court suggested that to the extent a statute "criminalizes a
suspect's failure to answer such questions put to him by police
officers, Fifth Amendment concerns are implicated."
at n.9, 75 L. Ed. 2d at 910-11, n.9 (emphasis added).

Id., 461 U.S.
In this

case, the vagueness of the Mini-Grand Jury Act deters the exercise
of the privilege against self-incrimination.

Hence, constitution-

ally-protected conduct is directly affected.
The Court has observed that "perhaps the most meaningful
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aspect of the vagueness doctrine is not actual notice, but the
other principal element of the doctrine - the requirement that a
legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law
enforcement.

Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574, 39 L. Ed. 2d 605,

613, 94 S. Ct. 1242 (1974).14

The danger with vague statutes is

that "[sltatutory language of such a standardless sweep allows
policemen, prosecutors and juries to pursue their personal
predilections."

Id., 415 U.S. at 575, 39 L. Ed. 2d at 613.

It is true that the Mini-Grand Jury Act, strictly
speaking, is not a penal statute.

It is most definitely, however,

a criminal procedure statute that bears directly on penal
statutes.

The Act is, in many instances, the muscle behind the

penal statutes because it is the means by which prosecutors gather
evidence to obtain convictions for criminal offenses.

Thus, the

authority given prosecutors in the Act to carte blanche set their
own standards for criminal procedure is patently unconstitutional

l4

Along the same lines, the Court stated in Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408
U.S. 104f 108-09, 33 L. Ed. 2d 222, 227-28, 92 S. Ct. 2294 (1972):
[If] arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement is to be prevented, laws must provide
explicit standards for those who apply them. A
vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy
matters to policemen, judges, and juries for
resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis,
with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and
discriminatory application.
(Footnotes omitted).
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on void-for-vagueness grounds and renders the entire Act unconstitutional on its face.

IV.

EVIDENCE OBTAINED THROUGH CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS CANNOT
BE USED IN CIVIL ACTIONS UNLESS JUDICIALLY APPROVED AFTER
A SHOWING OF PARTICULARIZED NEED.
During the May 30, 1984 hearing, Judge Bunnell ordered,

among other things, that the "[investigations conducted under the
authority of the Act must be limited to criminal investigations."
Memorandum Decision at 2.

After the second hearing. Judge Bunnell

in his Memorandum Decision criticized the Attorney General's use of
information obtained through this criminal investigation for civil
proceedings:
Some criminal charges have already been
filed in Salt Lake County based upon
information obtained through this proceeding,
and a civil antitrust case has been filed in
Salt Lake County, also as a result of some of
the information derived from this investigative
proceeding. This investigative proceeding is
still open and being used for whatever purposes
the State desires and solely within their
discretion under the Act, without limitation as
to when a criminal investigation becomes a
prosecution or controlling the ultimate use of
the findings for civil purposes.
Id. at 3-4.
The Attorney General's denial that any portion of the
civil antitrust action filed in Salt Lake City was based on
information derived from the criminal investigation, see
Appellant's Brief at 22, appears to be contradicted by his April
19, 1984 Motion for Partial Release of Secrecy Order and Order
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CS#1.

(Record at 3 3 - 3 4 ) . 1 S

In arguing that information obtained

from the criminal investigation may be used in c i v i l proceedings,
the Attorney General clouds the controlling rule of law by
describing the exception t o the general rule without clearly
labeling i t as such.

The general rule i s that evidence gathered

in a criminal investigation cannot be used for c i v i l enforcement.
The Fourth Circuit in In re Grand Jury Subpoenas. April. 1978. at
Baltimore, 581 F.2d 1103 (4th Cir. 1978), c e r t , denied sub nom.
Fairchild Industries. Inc. v. Harvey. 440 U.S. 971, 59 L. Ed. 2d
787, 99 S. Ct. 2294 (1979), made clear that

M

[i]f the powers of

the grand jury, including the power to subpoena documents, are
used, not for the purpose of criminal investigation but rather t o
gather evidence for c i v i l enforcement, there e x i s t s an abuse of

15

I n h i s April 19, 1984 Motion for P a r t i a l Release, the Attorney General,
pursuant to U.C.A. § 77-22-2(3) made a p p l i c a t i o n to the court for an order
authorizing the r e l e a s e of c e r t a i n information necessary for the f i l i n g and
presentation of c i v i l and criminal a c t i o n s . The Attorney General s t a t e d i n
part:
This Motion i s made on the further conclusion t h a t
c e r t a i n information gathered during the course of
the Court's previously authorized i n v e s t i g a t i o n
w i l l , of n e c e s s i t y , be made public a t the time of
the f i l i n g of criminal and/or c i v i l actions*
This information includes the contents of
d e p o s i t i o n s , documents and other information
obtained from w i t n e s s e s .
(Record a t 3 3 ) . Judge Bunnell granted the Attorney General's
motion. (Record a t 3 4 ) .
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the grand jury process." Id. at 1108.

See Robert Hawthorne, Inc.

v. Director of Internal Revenue, 406 F. Supp. 1098, 1118 (E.D. Pa.
1976) (grand jury cannot be used by government as cover to obtain
records for civil investigation).
Even in United States v. Procter & Gamble Company, 356
U.S. 677, 683, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1077, 1082, 78 S. Ct. 983 (1958), one of
the cases cited by the Attorney General, the Supreme Court stated
that if "the prosecution was using criminal procedures to elicit
evidence in a civil case, . . . it would be flouting the policy of
the law."

In Procter & Gamble, the Court was faced with a

situation in which counsel for defendants was attempting to gain
access to a transcript of grand jury proceedings in which no
indictment was returned but from which the government used
information to proceed with a civil action for alleged violation of
the antitrust laws. The Court expressed its great reluctance to
remove the cloak of secrecy from any more of the grand jury
proceedings than was necessary.
It should be readily apparent that Procter & Gamble
presented a factual situation far different from the circumstances
of this case.

It is beyond dispute that there are extraordinary

instances in which limited information from a criminal
investigation properly may be authorized to be used in a civil
action.

However, the use of such evidence is permitted only after

a showing of particularized need which necessarily means that the
practice is not favored.

Judge Bunnell never was approached with
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such a showing of particularized need and yet concluded that
information obtained through the criminal investigation he approved
was improperly used to assist the Attorney General in its civil
action in Salt Lake City.

CONCLUSION
The Mini-Grand Jury Act is constitutionally flawed.
Prosecutors1 actions taken under the aegis of the Act are
accusatory in nature. And yet, persons summoned to give evidence
pursuant to administrative subpoenas tend to enjoy greater
procedural protections than are afforded persons under the
Mini-Grand Jury Act.

Because the Act fails to give notice of any

pre-compliance opportunity to challenge subpoenas and because
prosecutors are not required to inform witnesses of the nature and
scope of the investigation, no effective or just pre-compliance
remedy exists.
Moreover, Utah law requires that persons compelled to
appear as witnesses before grand juries be informed if they are or
become subjects of an investigation and that they be advised of
their right to assert the privilege against self-incrimination.
Both the equal protection and due process provisions of the
Constitution of Utah mandate that the same protections be extended
to those compelled to give evidence under the Mini-Grand Jury Act.
The constitutional infirmities of the Act relate to its
basic structure and are so fundamental that they cannot be
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rectified absent an impermissible, wholesale judicial rewriting of
the Act. Thus, UP&L submits that Judge Bunnell's September 20,
1984 Memorandum Decision Relative to Constitutionality should be
affirmed.
DATED this 3 5 7 £ day of February, 1985.
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
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ADDENDUM
Constitutional Provisions and Statutes
Constitution of the United States, Amendment V:
No person shall be held to answer for a
capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except
in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or
in the Militia, when in actual service in time of
War or public danger; nor shall any person be
subject for the same offence to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled
in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation.
Constitution of the United States, Amendment XIV, Section l:
All persons born or naturalized in the
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of
the State wherein they reside. No State shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Constitution of Utah, Article 1, Section 2:
Sec. 2. [All political power inherent in the
people.]
All political power is inherent in the
people; and all free governments are founded on
their authority for their equal protection and
benefit, and they have the right to alter or
reform their government as the public welfare may
require.
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Constitution of Utah, Article 1, Section 7:
Sec. 7.

[Due process of lav.]

No person shall be deprived of life, liberty
or property, without due process of law.
Constitution of Utah, Article 1, Section 12:
Sec. 12.

[Rights of accused persons.]'

In criminal prosecutions the accused shall
have the right to appear and defend in person and
by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof,
to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by
the witnesses against him, to have compulsory
process to compel the attendance of witnesses in
his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by
an impartial jury of the county or district in
which the offense is alleged to have been
committed, and the right to appeal in all cases.
In no instance shall any accused person, before
final judgment, be compelled to advance money or
fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The
accused shall not be compelled to give evidence
against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to
testify against her husband, nor a husband
against his wife, nor shall any person be twice
put in jeopardy for the same offense.
Constitution of Utah, Article 1, Section 13:
Sec. 13. [Prosecution by information or
indictment—Grand jury.]
Offenses heretofore required to be
prosecuted by indictment, shall be prosecuted by
information after examination and commitment by a
magistrate, unless the examination be waived by
the accused with the consent of the State, or by
indictment, with or without such examination and
commitment. The formation of the grand jury and
the powers and duties thereof shall be as
prescribed by the Legislature.
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Constitution of Utah, Article 1, Section 14:
Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbiddenIssuance of warrant.]
The right of the people to secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be
violated; and no warrant shall issue upon
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation,
particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the person or thing to be seized.
Utah Code Ann. SS 77-22-1 through 3:
77-22-1. Declaration of necessity. It is
declared, as a matter of legislative
determination, that it is necessary to grant
subpoena powers in aid of criminal investigations
and to provide a method of keeping information
gained from investigations secret both to protect
the innocent and to prevent criminal suspects
from having access to information prior to
prosecution and to clarify the power of the
attorney general and county attorneys to grant
immunity from prosecution to witnesses whose
testimony is essential to the proper conduct of a
criminal investigation or prosecution.
77-22-2. Right to subpoena witnesses and
require production of evidence-Contents of
subpoena-Interrogation before closed court.
(1) In any matter involving the investigation of
a crime, the existence of a crime or malfeasance
in office or any criminal conspiracy or activity,
the attorney general or any county attorney shall
have the right, upon application and approval of
the district court, for good cause shown, to
conduct an investigation in which the prosecutor
may subpoena witnesses, compel their attendance
and testimony under oath before any certified
court reporter, and require the production of
books, papers, documents, recordings and any
other items which constitute evidence or may be
relevant to the investigation in the judgment of
the attorney general or county attorney.

(2) The subpoena need not disclose the
names of possible defendants and need only
contain notification that the testimony of the
witness is sought in aid of criminal
investigation and state the time and place of the
examination, which may be conducted anywhere
within the jurisdiction of the prosecutor issuing
the subpoena, and inform the party served that he
is entitled to be represented by counsel.
Witness fees and expenses shall be paid as in a
civil action.
(3) The attorney general or any county
attorney may make written application to any
district court and the court may order that
interrogation of any witness shall be held in
secret; that such proceeding be secret; and that
the record of testimony be kept secret unless and
until the court for good cause otherwise orders.
The court may order excluded from any
investigative hearing or proceeding any persons
except the attorneys representing the state and
members of their staffs, the court reporter and
the attorney for the witness.
77-22-3. Immunity granted to witnessRefusal of witness to testify or produce
evidence-Powers granted prosecuting attorneys in
addition to other powers. In any investigation
or prosectuion of a criminal case, the attorney
general and any county attorney shall have the
power to grant transactional immunity from
prosecution to any person who is called or who is
intended to be called as a witness in behalf of
the state whenever the attorney general or county
attorney deems that the testimony of such person
is necessary to the investigation or prosecution
of such a case. No prosecution shall be
instituted against the person for any crime
disclosed by his testimony which is privileged
under this action, provided that should the
person testify falsely, nothing herein contained
shall be construed to prevent prosecution for
perjury.
If during the investigation or prosecution a
person refuses to answer a question or produce
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evidence of any kind on the ground that he may be
incriminated thereby, the attorney issuing the
subpoena may file a request in writing with the
district court in which the examination is being
conducted for an order requiring that person to
answer the question or produce the evidence
requested. The court shall set a time for
hearing and order the person to appear before the
court to show cause, if any he has, why the
question should not be answered or the evidence
produced, and the court shall order the question
answered or the evidence produced unless it finds
that to do so would be clearly contrary to the
public interest, or could subject the witness to
a criminal prosecution in another jurisdiction.
If the witness still refuses to answer or produce
the evidence, he shall be guilty of contempt of
court and punished accordingly. If the witness
complies with the order and he would have been
privileged to withhold the answer given or the
evidence produced by him except for this section,
that person shall not be prosecuted or subjected
to penalty or forfeiture on account of any fact
or act concerning which, he was ordered to answer
or produce evidence except he may nevertheless be
prosecuted or subjected to penalty for any
perjury, false swearing or contempt committed in
answering, failing to answer, or for producing or
failing to produce any evidence in accordance
with the order.
The powers specified in this chapter are in
addition to any other powers granted to the
attorney general or county attorneys.
Utah Code Ann. S 77-11-3:
77-11-3. Evidence receivable-Witness to be
advised of rights. (1) The grand jury shall
receive no other evidence than is given by
witnesses under oath or affirmation, or
documentary evidence, or the deposition of a
witness taken as provided by law. The grand jury
shall receive only legal evidence.
(2) Any person called to testify before the
grand jury may be advised of his right to be
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represented by counsel. If a witness is or
becomes a subject of the investigation, he shall
be advised of that fact and of his right to
counsel, and of his privilege against self
incrimination. On demand of a witness for
representation by counsel, the proceedings shall
be delayed until counsel is present. In the
event that counsel of the witness1 choice is not
available, he shall be required to obtain or
accept other counsel.
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1

Emery County?

2

MR. OLSEN:

It is.

i

MR. NEBEKER:

And the subpoena carried that

4

designation on it, did it not?

5

MR. OLSEN:

6

That's my understanding.

correct, Wayne?

7

MR. WICKIZER:

8

MR. NEBEKER:

9
10
11

Is that

Yes.
Secondly, I would like to ask you on

the record if in fact Mr. Darcie White who has been subpoenaejd
here is a target in the investigation?
MR. OLSEN:

Right.

My response to that, as it was

12

off the record, is that we intend to ask Mr. White a series

13

of questions concerning his employment and relationships withj

14

not only his current employer but with previous employees and!

15

contractors with Utah Power & Light.

16

specific answer to give than that.

17

MR. NEBEKER:

I don't have a more

Can you state more specifically

18

whether or not he is in fact being considered as a target of

19

the investigation?

20

MR. OLSEN:

There isn't a way for me to be more

21

specific than that.

22

continue the investigation, that all persons who we've become^

23

aware of or interview or depose, that we would review their

24

depositions or information that we gain about those persons

25

and review their potential criminal liability.

I think it is fair to say that as we

That's as

1

specific as I'm able to be.

2

MR. NEBEKER: Well, for the record, I think I woul<3

3 I say that I don't think that response is adequate because I
4

think he's entitled to know whether or not he is the subject

5

of a criminal investigation.

I think you should, at this

6 J time, be required to tell him whether or not he is the subjecjt
7

of the investigation because I think certain questions that

8 I may be put to him may require him to take the Fifth Amendment]
9

if he deems it necessary.

10 J

MR. OLSEN:

11 I as candid as I can.

I think he f s entitled to know thatj

I understand that concern and I'm being
I think it's fair to say, Steve, that

12

if there is a question asked, for example, if he did anything

13

which we may later look at as being a potential criminal

14

violation, then we would look at it and review it with a

15

view to potential prosecution.

16

candid as I can about that.

17

as to any person that we have absolutely eliminated that

18

specific person. We have not done, nor, I think, can we

19

legitimately do that.

20

there.

21

at this point.

22

I'm honestly being as

I don't know that we have said

I'm honestly not holding back anything

That's my response and we're not eliminating anyone

MR. NEBEKER:

Well, if that's all you're willing

23

to put on the record, then I guess we'll just have to let

24

the record stand as it is, but my position is that he's

25

entitled to know that.

I think the Attorney General's offic4

A-9

1

should be required to tell him that,

2

EXAMINATION

3

BY MR. OLSEN;

4 1

Q

Mr. White, I wonder if you would give us your full

5 J name and the spelling of each of the names, please.
6
7
8 I
9
10 I

A

Okay, my name is Darcie, D-a-r-c~i-e, middle initiafl

H, White, W-h-i-t-e.
Q

Mr. White, what is your business and home addresses)

please?
A

My business address is 1407 West North Temple,

11

Salt Lake City. My home address is 2817 Cherry Blossom Lane

12

in Salt Lake City.

13

Q

Would you give us your telephone numbers as well,

14 please.
15
16

A

At the office, my business phone is 535-2460. At

home, itfs 277-9797.

17

Q

Could you give us your date of birth?

18

A

September 20, 1926.

19

Q

If you would, give us the name of your current

20

employer?

21

A

Utah Power & Light Company.

22

0

How long have you been employed with Utah Power &

23

Light?

24

A

Just short of 34 years.

25

Q

What is your current position?
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1

I

P R O C E E D I N G

2 I

S

W. JACK ELIASON,

3 | called as a witness by and on behalf of the Attorney General,
4 J being first duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows
5 J

MR. OLSEN:

The record should reflect that

6 [Mr. Eliason has been sworn in this case.

Let me just

7

indicate that present are Mr. Eliason and his attorney,

8

Mr. Steve Nebeker; Mr. Stan Olsen from the Attorney General's

9

office, Suzanne Dallimore from the Attorney General's office,

10 and an investigator, Mr. Wayne Wickizer from the Attorney
11 General's office.
12 I

MR. NEBEKER:

Let me also ask, Mr. Olsen, the same

13 question that I asked you before with regard to whether or
14 not Mr. Eliason is a target of the investigation that is
15 being conducted by the Attorney General's office?

I would

16

like to include in that whether or not Utah Power & Light

17

itself is the subject of the criminal investigation.

18

MR. OLSEN:

Well, I think with respect to the lattejr

19

question as to whether or not Utah Power & Light is, I think

20

that initially the affidavit and secrecy order was styled

21

Utah Power & Light, and I suppose, in a general way, that it

22

is true that we are looking at a number of aspects which

23

relate to the company.

24

and candid as I can on that.

25

Again, I want to be as forthright

MR. NEBEKER: I appreciate that.

MR. OLSEN:

With respect to your second question,

let me see if I can be more direct and phrase it this way:
It's my intention to ask a question or questions of
Mr. Eliason, among many others, and the answers, depending
on what they are, might indeed subject him to criminal
liability, depending on the answers.
MR. NEBEKER:

All right, fine.

I think we'll let

him go ahead and answer the questions but I think we understand generally that you're approaching Mr. Eliason the same
way you're approaching Mr. White in the substance of asking
him questions and you're leaving open the question of whether|
or not there might be criminal charges pending.
MR. OLSEN:

That's correct.

One other further thing in terms of preliminaries,
Mr. Eliason is here pursuant to our serving of a subpoena
on him through

—

MR. NEBEKER:
MR. OLSEN:
preliminary

Yes, that's correct.

Mr. Eliason, let me give you a quick

—

MR. NEBEKER:

Be sure to keep your voice up,

Mr. Eliason has a hearing aid and I think he would appreciate]
it if you would speak loudly to him.
EXAMINATION
BY MR. OLSEN:
Q

Mr. Eliason, I don't know if you have had your
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I would also like to again ask of the representative
of the Attorney General's Office who's here to take the
deposition if Utah Power & Light or any officer or employee
or agent of the company is the target of the investigation
that's currently being conducted by the AG's office.
MS. DALLIMORE:

Well, in response to that,

Mr. Nebeker, all I can say is that at this point the focus
on targets is not completed so that anyone is potentially
a target of this investigation.
MR. NEBEKER:

Beyond that, I cannot go.

Let me again state my objection to

that response inasmuch as I think we are entitled to know if
any of those entities, to wit, the company itself, either
the officers or directors of the company or any agents or
employees of the company are the target of the investigation.
We have not had that identified to us at this time.
MS. DALLIMORE:

I would suggest, though, that if

there are questions that I ask that may incriminate
Mr. Christensen or may be incriminating to any of your
other clients, you, of course, would maybe want to think
about advising him not to answer those.
will do that.

I am sure that you

I take it you are here representing

Mr. Christensen as an officer or employee of Utah Power &
Light?
MR. NEBEKER:

Yes, I'm here as attorney for Utah

Power & Light representing Mr. Christensen as an employee of

A-IK

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR EMERY COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
-0O0IN THE MATTER OF A

Deposition of:

CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION.

RICHARD J. RICHE
-0O0-

BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 17th day of April,
1984, the deposition of RICHARD J. RICHE, produced as
a witness herein at the instance of the Attorney
General's Office herein, in the above-entitled action
now pending in the above-named court, was taken before
Rashell Garcia, a Certified Shorthand Reporter and
Notary Public in and for the State of Utah, commencing
at the hour of 10:15 a.m. of said day at the Attorney
General's Office, State Capitol Building, Room 307,
Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
That said deposition was taken pursuant to Subpoena.
-oOo-

C©PY
RASHELL GARCIA

INDEPENDENT
REPORTING
SERVICE

801-322-1029

PRO C E E D I N G S
RICHARD J. RICHE,
called as a witness by and on behalf of the Attorney
General's Office, being first duly sworn, was examined and
testified as follows:
MR. OLSEN:

The record should reflect that we are

here pursuant to subpoena and the witness has been sworn.
Present is the witness; his counsel, Mr. Steve
Nebeker, Stan Olsen, the attorney from the Attorney General's
Office; and Wayne Wickizer, also from the Attorney General's
Office.
MR. NEBEKER:

Mr. Olsen, before we start the

deposition, I would again make a request similar to the one
I made before and that is, can you advise Mr. Riche as to
whether or not he is the subject or target of the investigation and whether or not Utah Power & Light is, in fact, the
subject of the investigation.
MR. OLSEN:

Well, I can respond as we have before

with respect to the witness and maybe a bit more specifically
with regard to Mr. Riche.

He is not at this point con-

sidered a target of any investigation.

That is not to say

that the result of what we find out here would not change
that, but I'm comfortable in saying to you and to him that
he's not here and is not specifically the target of our
investigation at this point.
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1

MR. NEBEKER:

2

MR. OLSEN:

Okay.

With regard to the company, we are

S not ruling that possibility out either in previous deposi4 tions or to date.
$

MR. NEBEKER:

Let me state that under the statute

6 that gives the Attorney General's Office that authority to
7 proceed with such an investigation, it's my understanding
8 that that statute has been referred to as the Grand Jury
• statute.

Under Section 77-11-3 of the Utah Code

10 Annotated, which deals with the powers and duties of a
It Grand Jury, it states, and I quote, "Any person called to
12 testify before the Grand Jury may be advised of his right
II to be represented by counsel." And then it goes on to
14 say, "If a witness is or becomes a subject of the investiga15 tion, he shall be advised of that fact and of his right to
16 counsel, and of his privilege against self-incrimination."
17 And then it goes on to say, "On demand of a witness for
It representation of counsel, the proceedings shall be delayed
19 until counsel is present."
20
21

And I really make that statement on the record
for the reason that we view these proceedings to be under

22 the same guidelines as those that relate to Grand Jury,
21 Grand Jury investigations, and it's our position—and it
24 may be at some time that we'll have to take this to court—
25 that each one of the witnesses are entitled to be advised of

4

1 whether or not they are the subject of the investigation and
2 we're entitled to inquire whether or not the company itself
3 is the subject of the investigation.

However, for purposes

4 of proceeding now, we're going to simply make our record
5 clear on that matter.
MR. OLSEN:

6

Okay, understood.
EXAMINATION

7
f BY MR. OLSEN:
9

Q

Sir, will you give us your name,- please, your full

10 name?
II

A

Richard J. Riche.

12

Q

Will you spell that for the reporter, please.

13

A

R-i-c-h-a-r-d, capital J., R-i-c-h-e.

14

Q

And it's pronounced Riche; is that right?

15

A

Yes.

16

Q

Mr. Riche, what's your home address?

Where do

17 you live?
IS

A

It's either Post Office Box 477 or 749, Castle Dale

19 Road, Helper, Utah.
20
21

Q

How long have you lived at that address, approxi-

mately?

22

A

Approximately—oh, it's been about 10 years.

23

Q

Where are you currently employed?

24

A

With Utah Power & Light out at the Hunter steam

25

plant located at Castle Dale.
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Utah Power & Light Company
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You are hereby commanded to set aside all business
and excuses and appear at the office of the Attorney General
of the State of Utahf 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah,
at the hour of 9:00 a.m., on Thursday, the 31st day of May, 1983,
to give testimony in support of a criminal investigation.

You

are entitled to be represented by legal counsel.
You are also commanded to bring with you any and all
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1.

Invoices, vouchers, checks and all documentation

in support of requests for reimbursement for guard services
from MTA and Vanguard for 12/1/77 to the present.
2.

Any and all correspondence to or from MTA,

Vanguard and L. Brent Fletcher which has not already been
produced.
3. Any and all L. Brent Fletcher work product,
i.e., manuals, forms, documents, papers, research, publications
and other such records not already produced.
4.

The most recent assignment of contract or other

agreement between Utah Power and Light and Vanguard.
5.

All expense vouchers and supporting documentation

for L. Brent Fletcher.
This Subpoena Duces Tecum is authorized by order of
the District Court.

Disobedience to this order is punishable

by contempt of Court.
Given under my hand this

day of May, 1984.
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Attorney General
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Assistant Attorney General
Chief, Litigation Division
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